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Abstract—We study the problem of robust sensor fusion
in visual perception, especially under the autonomous driving
settings. We evaluate the robustness of RGB camera and LiDAR
sensor fusion for binary classification and object detection. In
this work, we are interested in the behavior of different fusion
methods under adversarial attacks on different sensors. We first
train both classification and detection models with early fusion
and late fusion, then apply different combinations of adversarial
attacks on both sensor inputs for evaluation. We also study
the effectiveness of adversarial attacks with varying budgets.
Experiment results show that while sensor fusion models are
generally vulnerable to adversarial attacks, late fusion method is
more robust than early fusion. The results also provide insights
on further obtaining robust sensor fusion models.
Index Terms—Robust sensor fusion, autonomous driving, ad-
versarial attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous driving (AD) depend heavily on visual per-
ception from multiple sensors, such as camera and LiDAR.
It is believed that fusion of different sensors provides richer
information than a single modality, which further boosts the
liability of AD visual perception, e.g., LiDAR point cloud
can provide additional depth information for RGB images.
Given the stakes in human lives, it is critical to ensure that
AD visual perception is robust. Yet, there have been a series
of demonstrates that deep neural networks, that provide the
core perceptual reasoning machinery, are vulnerable to small
adversarial perturbations to inputs [3], [6], [9], [10], [18].
Nevertheless, despite a great deal of research into vul-
nerability of specific sensors to adversarial examples, there
has been little research studying robustness of sensor fusion
systems. On the one hand, issue of suboptimal sensor fu-
sion has seen some prior attention, including Movellan and
Mineiro [20], who show that performance of fusion models can
be worse than single-modality models because the multimodal
information is not fused optimally. On the other hand, with
the use of deep learning in AD, we also need to pay attention
to the robustness of sensor fusion models under adversarial
settings.
We propose to investigate three questions related to robust
visual sensor fusion in adversarial settings:
1) Is the fusion model robust against adversarial attacks on
one or more sensors?
2) Which fusion paradigms, early or late fusion, are more
robust?
Fig. 1: An example of adversarial attack on sensor fusion
(early) model. We apply adversarial patch on the RGB image,
and PGD attack on the original 3D point cloud which causes
point shifting on the depth map. Note that in our model, we
are taking the entire RGB-D image as input. The cropped car
is for illustration only.
3) How can we develop robust fusion models against
adversarial attacks?
Yu et al. [41] recently partially explored the first question.
They study the vulnerability of a particular sensor fusion
approach under different sensor attacks, while we are also
interested in behaviors of fusion models under other circum-
stances, e.g., when one of the input sensors is disabled.
To answer these questions, we focus on evaluating the
robustness of sensor fusion in visual perception from RGB
camera and LiDAR. To simplify the problem, we focus on
detecting whether there is car in front or not, to mimic the
real world scenario where we want to make decisions about
whether to brake. We study both classification and detection
tasks under this setting. For classification tasks, we train
models to make binary decisions, while in detection, we keep
the normal routine of detection models, and decide whether
there is car in front using the predicted bounding boxes.
For the first question, we apply projected gradient descent
(PGD) attacks [19] with lp-norm restrictions on both camera
and LiDAR sensors for all models. The attack on camera
image is restricted to a patch within the car bounding box,
to simulate the situation where the car surface is partially
covered. For LiDAR attack, we restrict the perturbation to
points within the car bounding box. For ablation study, we
also apply LiDAR attack on the entire point cloud and on the
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background points. Then, we study the effectiveness of attacks
under different budgets: for the LiDAR attack, we vary the 
bound on the lp-norm restriction, while for the image attack
we vary the size of the adversarial patch.
For the second question, we compare two widely used
fusion methods, early fusion and late fusion. For early fusion,
we project 3D LiDAR points onto the RGB image pixels as the
depth map. For late fusion, we concatenate the convolutional
features of RGB image and LiDAR point cloud for the final
prediction. In Fig. 1, we illustrate an example of adversarial
attacks on camera and LiDAR sensors in early fusion mod-
els. Through the experiments, we will discuss the possible
solutions to the third problem and the potential difficulties in
achieving robust sensor fusion.
The rest of the paper are organized as follows. In section II,
we sum up the related works. Section III introduces the
baseline models, fusion strategy, and attack methods used in
this work. In section IV, we have experiment setups, results,
and discussion on robust sensor fusion. Conclusions are drawn
in section V.
II. RELATED WORKS
A. Robust sensor fusion
Sensor fusion, or multimodality, has been a widely studied
topic with the rise of deep learning. Data collected from
multiple sensors are fused together to deal with complex tasks,
e.g., audio-visual fusion in speech recognition (e.g. [8], [21])
and video captioning (e.g. [27], [36]).
In autonomous driving (AD), fusion of LiDAR point clouds
and RGB images are very frequently used. Depending on
different stages of fusion, we can divide sensor fusion into
early fusion and late fusion. Some literature, e.g. [11], has
an additional class called middle fusion. In our paper, late
fusion refers to fusion happening after all the convolutional
layers. The detailed definition is in section III. Most early
fusion models uses RGB-D images as input where LiDAR
points are converted into depth map as an additional channel
for RGB images, e.g. MVX-Net [32], AVOD [14], Frustum
PointNet [25]. Some other early fusion methods project RGB
images onto bird-eye view (BEV) plane of LiDAR point
clouds (e.g. [38]). The idea behind different early fusion
methods is the same, which is to align both sensors in the same
representation space and extract joint features. The simplest
late fusion method is naive feature concatenation (e.g. [24]).
In object detection, late fusion can also happen after region
proposals (e.g. [1]). Multi-stage fusion is also widely used
(e.g. [16]). In our work, we specify early fusion as RGB-D,
and late fusion as naive feature concatenation. Other sensors
like radar [5], thermal image [17] and HD-map [40] are also
used in AD sensor fusion. We refer the readers to [11] for a
much more detailed literature review on AD sensor fusion.
As for robust sensor fusion, [20] studies the robustness
of audio-visual fusion against catastrophic fusion problem in
speech recognition. [42] proposes a multimodal model which
is robust to the absence of some sensors. [31] focuses on
the uncertainty of input data from different sensors, including
the differences in physical units of measurement, sampling
resolutions, and spatio-temporal alignment. However, there
is no previous work on robustness of sensor fusion models
against adversarial attacks, which is a raising concern with
the use of deep learning.
B. Adversarial perturbations
We focus on literature about adversarial perturbations on
visual perception using RGB camera and LiDAR sensors.
1) RGB Image: In the literature of adversarial attack on
images [13], [15], [19], [22], [35], [37], white-box attacks
and black-box attacks are the two main categories. In white-
box attacks, attackers have access to all the information of
the model, while in black-box attacks, the information of
the model is partially or entirely concealed. In our work, we
assume that the attackers have white-box access to the models,
and that they use projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [19]
which is a considerably stronger white-box attacks. There are
also works on black-box attacks on traffic signs, e.g., [23].
Image attack is also the most studied topic in adversarial
perturbation on AD because of its low cost and rich literature.
Most AD related adversarial attacks target on traffic signs,
e.g. [9] proposes a physically realizable attack on traffic sign
classifier, and [6], [10], [18] generate malicious signs to fool
object detectors. There are also attacks trying to confuse the
decision system of AD. [7] proposes an evasion attack against
the steering angle prediction which causes the autonomous car
to head towards wrong directions.
Adversarial patch [2], originally proposed to attack image
classifiers, are also applied on AD related systems. [28] put a
patch in video to attack optical flow. [33] attaches adversarial
patch on a person to make them invisible to YOLOv2 object
detector. In our work, we follow the objective in [33] to attack
YOLOv3 detector, while the target is car instead of person.
2) LiDAR: In [39], they perturb the entire point cloud with
no restrictions. However, this attack is not physically realizable
because it is not easy to arbitrarily add or shift LiDAR points.
[3] uses sensor spoofing to add adversarial points into the point
cloud read by the LiDAR sensor to attack the machine learning
model in LiDAR-based perception. Other physically realizable
attacks uses real-world objects to fool the models, e.g., [4]
designs an adversarial object which cannot be detected by
LiDAR-based perceptions, and [34] attaches adversarial mesh
over the roof of the car to attack LiDAR detectors.
3) Fusion: [41] is a very recent and the only paper
to our knowledge that studies adversarial attacks on fusion
models. They claim that current fusion models fail to use
the complementary relationships among different sensors in
the adversarial setting. In our work, we not only evaluate
different sensor attacks on fusion models, but also compare the
attacks with disabled sensors, i.e. no input from those sensors,
to evaluate the contribution of each sensor to the prediction.
Moreover, we study the effect of different fusion methods on
adversarial attacks, while they only use early fusion model for
evaluation.
III. MODELS
In this section, we introduce the models and the attack
methods we use for the evaluation.
A. Baseline models
We can formulate a deep sensor fusion model with n sensors
as
y = f(x1,x2, . . . ,xn; θ), (1)
where f is the neural network model, xi stands for the i-th
sensor input, θ for the neural network parameters, and y is the
output of the model, which can be interpreted as class label
for classification, or bounding box prediction for detection. In
this work, we focus on fusion of two sensors, i.e. RGB camera
and LiDAR.
Before going further into any details, we first define early
fusion and late fusion used in our paper. In early fusion, two
sensors are fused at the input level. For image and LiDAR,
we convert LiDAR into depth map, and add it as an additional
channel to the RGB image. In late fusion, we use feature
concatenation after the feature extractor of each model.
1) Classification: We use VGG16 and ResNet18 for the
image classifier, and PointNet [26] for the LiDAR classifier.
For simplicity, we use ConvNet to refer to both VGG and
ResNet. Late fusion of classification concatenates the con-
volutional features of ConvNet and PointNet, then feed the
fused feature to a new set of fully connected layers for further
training, as shown in Fig. 2a. Fig. 2b illustrates early fusion
model using RGB-D image as input to ConvNet. In detail,
LiDAR points are projected onto the RGB image pixel space
as an additional depth channel, and a fifth channel is attached
to indicate the non-zero values of the depth channel using 0’s
and 1’s. We use a differentiable RGB-D module implemented
via kornia [30] to generate RGB-D images out of RGB images
and LiDAR points, so that the adversarial perturbation can be
applied directly on the 3D point cloud instead of on the depth
map.
2) Detection: Detection task is more complex than classifi-
cation. Some detection models such as the RCNN family use a
two-stage structure (region proposal and object classification),
while YOLO only needs one stage (generating proposals and
classification results at the same time). For two-stage detection
models, it is ambiguous whether feature concatenation in
region proposal networks should be called late fusion or
early fusion. To make the concepts clear, we use the single-
stage YOLOv3 [29] as the detection model. The structures
of both late fusion and early fusion models are similar to
classification which are already shown in Fig. 2. The only
difference lays in the late fusion model, where YOLOv3 has
shortcut connections between Darknet, the feature extractor,
and the YOLO layers. In our work, we simply concatenate the
LiDAR feature with RGB image feature after the Darknet. The
intermediate features are not fused, meaning that the shortcuts
only pass RGB image features to the YOLO layers.
(a) Late fusion model using feature concatenation
(b) Early fusion model using RGB-D image
Fig. 2: Structure of late fusion and early fusion models. “
⊕
”
stands for the fusion operation. In (a), the LiDAR feature ex-
tractor is the convolutional layers in PointNet for classification,
and Darknet for detection. Note that in classification, PointNet
feature extractor takes the original point cloud as input, while
in detection, Darknet takes depth map as input. Similarly, the
RGB image feature extractor is the convolutional layers in
ConvNet for classification, and Darknet for detection. The final
layers are fully connected layers for classification, and YOLO
layers for detection.
B. Threat models
In this work, we study the effect of adversarial attacks
on both classification and detection models. Commonly, the
problem of attacking one or more sensors in a sensor fusion
model can be formulated as
argmax
δ
L(f(. . . ,xi +mi ∗ δi, . . . ;θ), y) (2)
s.t. mi ∈M ,
‖δi‖p ≤ i,∀i ∈ I,
δi = 0,∀i ∈ Ic,
where L(·) is the attacker’s utility function, xi is the i-
th sensor input, δi is the perturbation, i is the lp-norm
restriction, I stands for the set of sensors to be attacked,
Ic for the set of sensors remaining normal, and m denotes
the projection restriction inside the feasible region M , which
can be the car bounding box, the entire image, or the entire
point cloud depending on which sensor is attacked and what
level of restriction is applied. Note that we have different ’s
for different sensors attacked, because different sensors have
different measurement of scale in their original input space,
e.g. in RGB image, lp norm shows the pixel difference, while
in LiDAR point cloud, lp norm means the physical world
distance.
Adversarial attacks on image branch is rather easy, as there
are many previous works such as adversarial stickers. We
leverage adversarial stickers computed via projected gradient
descent (PGD), to partially cover the surface of cars. To
achieve this goal, we place the sticker within the 2D bounding
box of cars, and use grid search to find the best initialization
location of the sticker.
For LiDAR attacks, we focus on PGD attacks with lp-norm
restriction, which is a simple but reasonable way to study
the robustness of fusion models. The attack will only shift
points in the 3D space. Adding or removing points are not
allowed. We try attacks within the 3D bounding boxes of cars,
as well as on the entire point cloud and the background points
respectively to study what the LiDAR model has learned from
the input data. For models using RGB-D feature, the PGD
attack is still posed to the original point cloud instead of the
depth map.
The attack objective for classification is to make the model
fail to predict cars in front. The utility function L is the
cross entropy loss, targeted at the positive class, namely “car
in front”. For attacks on detection models, we aim to make
the model detect nothing in front even if there is a car. The
attack fails when the IoU between the predicted bounding box
and the ground truth bounding box is greater than 0.1. We
use the similar loss function, objectness score of the front
car, proposed in [33] to generate adversarial perturbations on
YOLOv3 model.
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
We perform the experiments on KITTI [12] dataset. The
dataset has 7, 481 samples with 2D and 3D bounding box
provided. The LiDAR coordinate system in KITTI dataset is
defined as: +x means front, +y is left, and +z points upward.
We define the front region as
F = {p(xp, yp, zp)|xp ∈ [0, 20], yp ∈ [−1.8, 1.8]},
i.e. the area 20 meters ahead within the current lane (usually a
lane in the US is about 3.6 meters wide). There is no constraint
on zp because all cars are on the surface of the road. A car is
in front if the 3D bounding box of the car overlaps with F .
TABLE I: Accuracy scores of individual models
Models Original Accuracy
Image (VGG) 0.977
Image (ResNet) 0.969
LiDAR 0.894
Late fusion (VGG) 0.977
Late fusion (ResNet) 0.970
Early fusion (VGG) 0.992
Early fusion (ResNet) 0.977
A. Classification
In the experiments, we are measuring the attack success
rate on “car-in-front” class. We choose a subset of KITTI
(a) VGG w.r.t.  (b) ResNet w.r.t. 
(c) VGG w.r.t. area (d) ResNet w.r.t. area
Fig. 3: Comparison of image attacks on single-image, early
fusion, and late fusion models.  is the l∞ budget of the PGD
attack, and area is the ratio of patch size and the bounding
box size.
(a) Late fusion (b) Early fusion
Fig. 4: l∞ LiDAR attack on the entire point cloud w.r.t.
different  on early and late fusion models. Y-axis is scaled
within 0− 10%.
dataset to perform the binary classification task. Samples
of “car in front” class are selected by the overlapping rule
mentioned above, and there are 219 such samples in the entire
dataset. Samples of “no car” class are selected if no car bound-
ing boxes overlaps with {p|xp ∈ [0, 40], yp ∈ [−3.6, 3.6]}, a
larger region in front. This is to avoid ambiguous situations
where a car lies on the edge of region F . To ensure the class
distribution is balanced, we further randomly select samples
from this subset. Eventually, we have 306 samples for training
and 132 samples for validation, and the class distribution is
50 to 50 in both sets.
We first train all the models needed for ablation studies in
adversarial attacks. The results are shown in Table I. Then, in
Fig. 3, we plot the success rate of image attack on different
models with respect to different ’s and patch sizes. E.g. in
Fig. 3a, we illustrate how the attack success rate changes with
different ’s among late fusion, early fusion, and single models
using VGG as backbone. From all 4 subfigures, we can see that
(a) Attack within car bounding box (b) Attack on entire point cloud (c) Attack on background points
Fig. 5: LiDAR attack effect w.r.t. different  on PointNet.
early fusion models are as vulnerable as single image models
when using VGG as backbone, and are more vulnerable
than single models when using ResNet as backbone. On the
contrary, late fusion models are less vulnerable, as we can see
the obvious gap between the two fusion methods. Moreover,
we can see that although fusion models with VGG backbone
and ResNet backbone have similar accuracy scores, models
with VGG backbone are more vulnerable than models with
ResNet backbone.
Attacking LiDAR is not effective on fusion models. If we
restrict the perturbation to points within the car bounding
boxes, the success rates are always 0 under various ’s.
Therefore, in Fig. 4, we show the results of adversarial attack
on the entire point cloud, which contain nonzero values to
plot meaningful figures. We can see that the success rate of
l∞ attack on LiDAR is very low on both late and early fusion
models, even with a fairly large . If we try l2 restriction,
the success rates also drop to 0. One possibly reason is that
the LiDAR model is effectively ignored in the fused models.
However, accuracy of fusion models is higher than when we
use image-only models, suggesting that LiDAR does indeed
play some role in prediction.
To demonstrate that the failure of attacks on LiDAR in the
fusion models is not due to the failure of our algorithm, we
analyze the adversarial attack on single LiDAR model, i.e.
PointNet. In Fig. 5b, we can see that PointNet is extremely
vulnerable to adversarial attacks even when  = 1. Even if we
only perturb the points within the car bounding boxes, we can
still achieve higher success rate on PointNet than on fusion
models. The interesting thing is that attacking the background
points, as shown in Fig. 5c is almost as effective as attacking
the entire point cloud. This means that the classification task
on point cloud is not only learning the car itself, but the
entire environment (for example, absence of points in the
area where the car is may also be highly informative). In
any case, this provides additional evidence that sensor fusion
may significantly reduce the vulnerability of LiDAR-based
perception, whereas attacks on the image branch of the fusion
model remain highly effective.
Apart from image and LiDAR attacks, we also consider
disabling either sensors, i.e. cancelling out either image or
LiDAR input as a type of attack, since it also causes mis-
classification, to have reasonable comparisons among different
combinations of attacks. For early fusion, we simply set the
channel to be cancelled in RGB-D images to zero, e.g., if we
disable the LiDAR sensor, we manually set the values of depth
and indicator matrices to 0. For late fusion, we manually set
the feature vector of disabled sensor to 0 during concatenation.
In table II, we evaluate different combinations of attacks
with fixed  for both attacks (image = 1, lidar = 5) and
fixed patch size for image attacks (area = 50%). Because
LiDAR attack within car bounding boxes has no effect on
all the fusion models, we report the results of attacks on the
entire point cloud to have a meaningful comparison. In column
1, the success rate of LiDAR attack is extremely low. From
columns 3 and 4, we can see that the image branch dominates
the prediction in both fusion models. The joint attack of image
and LiDAR has lower success rate than image attack only as
listed in columns 2 and 5, which implies that under the same
restrictions, simply optimizing the objective in Eq. 2 might not
be optimal when it comes to multiple sensors. An interesting
phenomenon observed from columns 2 and 6 is that the image
attack on early fusion models is less effective when the LiDAR
sensor is disabled.
It is also interesting to notice from columns 4, 8, and 9 that
cancelling image channel causes late fusion models to predict
everything as “car in front” class, but disabling the sensor
literally means the prediction should be “no car” based on its
input. The possible reason is that in the feature concatenation
layer, the bias term is not modified even when both sensors are
disabled, and the last few layers of the model uses information
from the bias term to make false predictions.
As an attempt to circumvent this issue, we use feature
dropout to retrain the fusion models. The idea is that sensor
fusion models should be robust against the absence of part of
the sensors. During training, we randomly replace either image
or LiDAR feature with zeros, and the results on models trained
with feature dropout are shown in table III and IV. We can
see from column 4 in table IV that ResNet late fusion model
and VGG early fusion model has better performance when
we disable the camera sensor. However, this brings us lower
overall accuracy, and the vulnerability issue remains unsolved.
TABLE II: Evaluation of attacks on fusion models. LiDAR attacks are l∞ attacks on entire point cloud. 3 means true data,
7 means adversarial data, N means disabled sensor. * denotes that although the success rate on “car in front” class is 0, the
success rate on “no car” class is 1.0.
Image 3 7 3 N 7 7 N N
LiDAR 7 3 N 3 7 N 7 N
success rate (late VGG) 0.0 0.446 0.0 0.0* 0.431 0.492 0.0* 0.0*
success rate (late ResNet) 0.062 0.215 0.077 0.0* 0.215 0.354 0.0* 0.0*
success rate (early VGG) 0.030 0.636 0.030 0.985 0.530 0.484 1.0 1.0
success rate (early ResNet) 0.0 0.385 0.0 1.0 0.354 0.215 1.0 1.0
TABLE III: Accuracy of models trained with feature dropout
Models Original Accuracy
Late fusion (VGG) 0.977
Late fusion (ResNet) 0.954
Early fusion (VGG) 0.977
Early fusion (ResNet) 0.939
(a) AP w.r.t.  (b) Success rate w.r.t. 
(c) AP w.r.t. area (d) Success rate w.r.t. area
Fig. 6: Comparison of image attacks on different detection
methods.  is the l∞ budget of the PGD attack, and area is
the ratio of patch size and the bounding box size.
B. Detection
In detection, we train and validate the fusion models on
the entire KITTI dataset. The measurement of attack success
rate on detection models is slightly different. We still focus
on the “car in front” samples in the test set (66 in total which
are not used when the detection models are trained), but the
objective is to reduce the objectness score, i.e. to make the car
undetected rather than to cause misclassification. We say the
attack is successful if the IoU of the predicted car bounding
box and the ground truth label is less than 0.1. We also report
the average precision (AP) of the car detection. The ’s and
patch size used for table V are also the same as classification.
Similar to classification, we show how the AP and success
rate of image attack on detection models change with different
’s and patch sizes in Fig. 6. We can see that most conclusions
obtained on classification models also apply to detection
models. Late fusion in detection is more robust than both
early fusion and single model. Also, we can see that AP the
detection models can nearly drop to 0 with larger  or patch
size, and that in terms of attack success rate, using detection
models are more vulnerable than using classification models.
Also similar to classification, LiDAR attack does not affect
the performance of detection models much. The success rate
of LiDAR attack on both late and early fusion models are 0,
while the AP of early fusion drops 0.002 under the LiDAR
attack. However, when we look at column 4 in table V, we
can see a significant drop in AP when we disable the camera
sensor, even though the success rate is still 0. When comparing
columns 3 and 5, we find that disabling camera in late fusion
model will cause a strange phenomenon where the success
rate is 0 but the AP is very low. We further investigate the
detection model and find that after we disable the camera
sensor, the model predicts 10 times as many bounding boxes
than the normal model does. Similar situation occurs in the
corresponding experiment of the last column. This might be
the inherent flaw of YOLO models which is out of the scope
of our discussion. As shown in columns 3 and 6, the joint
attack of both sensors is still less effective on early fusion
models than the image attack, as it has slightly lower success
rate and higher AP after the attack.
C. Discussion
From the experiments on both classification and detection
models, we can go back to the three questions we proposed:
1) Is fusion model robust against adversarial attacks on
one or more sensors? : The answer is yes. We obtain similar
results with the concurrent work in [41], that the fusion models
are still vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Their work did not
compare the contribution of each sensor in the fusion model.
2) Will different fusion methods affect the effectiveness
of adversarial attacks?: The answer is also yes. We have
observed that late fusion models are more robust than early
fusion models under the same amount of attack for both
classification and detection tasks. The structure of early fusion
model, when compared with late fusion model, is obviously
more similar to the single image model. Therefore, the curves
of early fusion models are closer to those of single models. For
late fusion models, even though attacking the LiDAR branch
does not affect the overall performance, the effectiveness of
image attack is limited.
3) How can we build robust fusion models against ad-
versarial attacks?: Our work provides some insights on this
TABLE IV: Evaluation of attacks on fusion model (trained with dropout). LiDAR attacks are l∞ attacks on entire point cloud.
3 means true data, 7 means adversarial data, N means disabled sensor. The numbers in () shows the success rate on “no-car”
class if greater than 0. Note that this is only effective with disabled sensors.
Image 3 7 3 N 7 7 N N
LiDAR 7 3 N 3 7 N 7 N
success rate (late VGG) 0.0 0.615 0.0 0.0 (1.0) 0.6 0.631 0.0 (1.0) 0.0 (1.0)
success rate (late ResNet) 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.292 (0.328) 0.2 0.169 0.352 (0.328) 0.0 (1.0)
success rate (early VGG) 0.0 0.563 0.0 (0.015) 0.328 (0.215) 0.5 0.438 (0.015) 0.047 (0.215) 1.0
success rate (early ResNet) 0.016 0.222 0.032 (0.016) 0.032 (0.918) 0.206 0.222 (0.016) 0.0 (0.918) 1.0
TABLE V: Evaluation of attacks on detection models. LiDAR attacks are l∞ attacks on entire point cloud.
Image 3 3 7 3 N 7 7 N N
LiDAR 3 7 3 N 3 7 N 7 N
Late fusion success rate 0.0 0.0 0.749 0.0 0.0 0.754 0.712 0.0 0.0AP 0.603 0.603 0.068 0.345 0.055 0.064 0.043 0.055 0.196
Early fusion success rate 0.0 0.0 0.922 0.0 1.0 0.918 0.932 1.0 1.0AP 0.607 0.605 0.005 0.606 0.0 0.006 0.004 0.0 0.0
question. First of all, the comparison of early and late fusion
methods tells us that although early fusion models have
higher accuracy or average precision scores than late fusion
models, late fusion can make the model more robust than early
fusion. Second, in Fig. 3, by comparing the VGG backbone
models and ResNet backbone models from the classification
experiments set, we observe that ResNet is more robust than
VGG against image attacks, so does the fusion models using
ResNet as backbone when compared to those using VGG. We
may assume that the robustness of the backbone models can
contribute to the robustness of fusion models, so we can train
robust single-sensor models before training the fusion models.
Still, more experiments are needed to validate this assumption.
Third, existing methods of building robust sensor fusion may
not work under adversarial settings. Feature dropout as the
simplest way of gaining robustness against disabled sensors
is applied on classification models, yet the effect is subtle,
as it only partially circumvent the issue for some models.
What is worse, it makes the fusion model more vulnerable
to adversarial perturbations. The method proposed in [42] is
robust to the absence of some sensors, but they are using deep
neural networks as the model, which might still be vulnerable
to adversarial attacks. More evaluations in adversarial settings
are needed for these sensor fusion methods.
All the experiments are based on the binary decision of
detecting whether there is car in front or not, while the mech-
anisms behind this decision, e.g. classification and detection,
may or may not be binary. We already discuss the situations
with static scenes provided by the KITTI dataset. When faced
with dynamic decisions where we need to adjust to the change
of environments across a sequence of sensor snapshots, the
task could be more complex. Meanwhile, our work can still
be a valuable reference. In general, a more complex system is
more vulnerable and easier to attack. When we use detection
models for the binary decision, we first generate the bounding
boxes and class labels, then we decide whether the car is in
front or not. This gives us more freedom during attacks than in
classification tasks, especially binary classification. In a more
complex system involving dynamic scenes, the vulnerability
of the model will increase.
Nevertheless, this work has set the tone of studying the
adversarial robustness of fusion models. Not only do we need
to study the trend of attack effectiveness with various budgets,
but we also need to evaluate the contribution of each sensor to
the overall performance and robustness of the fusion model,
e.g. comparing adversarial attacks with disabling sensors, and
different combinations of them. Moreover, there are many
more complicated fusion methods such as the mixture of
late and early fusion where the fusion happens at multiple
places during the forward passing, and robust fusion methods
resolving the issue of disabled sensors, but are still potentially
vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Also, there are still questions
not answered such as “Can adversarial attack on one sensor
infiltrate other sensors?”, which will be left as future work.
In the experiments, we have some other interesting ob-
servations. If we attack the two sensors independently, the
success rate will be even lower than jointly attacking both
sensors, which is already inferior to attacking a single sensor.
Note that the upper bound of lp-norm restriction is different
across different sensors, e.g. image perturbation is limited by
the range of valid pixel values, and LiDAR points can be
shifted arbitrarily away if we do not consider the limit LiDAR
scan range or the realizability of the attack in physical world
settings. How to optimally attack multiple sensors at the same
time is also a possible future work direction.
V. CONCLUSION
This work focuses on the robustness of sensor fusion models
in visual perception using RGB camera and LiDAR. We
evaluate two different fusion methods, early fusion and late
fusion, in a simplified environment where we want to make a
binary decision on whether there is car in front or not. Both
classification and detection are studied in the experiments, and
the behavior of both tasks are similar and consistent. We find
that both fusion methods are vulnerable to adversarial attacks,
but late fusion is relatively more robust than early fusion.
We set the tone of studying adversarial robustness on fusion
models, which provides grist for the mill for designing robust
sensor fusion models.
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